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Abstract
This article argues for the necessity of the reform of the judicial appointment qualifi-
cation, and the judicial appointment powers in Egypt. The article presents judicial ap-
pointment process and requirement as the main case study. It illustrates the difference 
between de facto and de jure in the judicial appointment system in Egypt. These dif-
ferences pave the road to a deeper understanding of legal and political aspects of dis-
crimination against the poor, woman and political opposition within the appointment 
process. The article discusses the contemporary challenges in judicial appointment. 
The challenges can be summarized into: gender inequality, elimination of political mi-
norities, and under-privileged citizens. Finally, the article proposes a solution for the 
problems identified in this article. These solutions are based on reforming the both 
the judicial appointment qualification, and the judicial appointment powers in Egypt.
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i Introduction
The judicial appointment process involves several legal, political and social 
aspects.1 Inconsistency between these aspects can lead to discrimination and 
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ah Moawad, ‘Egypt’s Poor Revolution’ Muftah, October 24, 2014, <http://muftah.org/egypts 
-poor-revolution/#.V5w9iJOx81g> accessed 18 May 2017.
8 For Gender and Judicial Appointment, See Dominc O’Sullivan, ‘Gender and Judicial Appoint-
ment’ Univeristy Queenland Law Journal 107, (1996–1997): 108–09, See also, Rosalind Dixon, 
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inequality, eating away at the core of the judicial system.2 Both legal and po-
litical aspects of judicial appointment have a great impact on society.3 This 
is manifested in discrimination against political opponents, underprivileged 
citizens and women. In terms of gender inequality in judicial appointment in 
Egypt, presently only 68 out of 15,000 judges are female,4 indicating a clear lack 
of female representation in all three supreme courts (the Court of Cassation, 
the Supreme Administrative Court (State Council),5 and the Supreme Consti-
tutional Court).6 Equally, the underprivileged and political minorities rarely 
have an equal chance in the appointment process.7 Hence, this article is in the 
favor of the necessity of the reform of the judicial appointment qualification, 
and judicial appointment powers in Egypt.8
The judicial appointment process covers two aspects, judicial legitimacy, 
and that of judicial qualification.9 Firstly, the question of judicial legitimacy 
refers to the source of the judicial authority. In the republic system, while the 
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judge rules in the name of the people,10 the actual definition of the role of 
the people is challenging.11 It may take on a direct form of legitimacy, where 
the judge is directly elected, or it can take an indirect form, where the judge 
is appointed by an elected authority that is either the President, or both the 
President and Parliament (Congress).12 In Egypt, Article 20 of the 1973 Judi-
cial Authority Law (jal) states, “judgments are issued in the name of the peo-
ple.”13 The definition of the people, however, was left out. There was no clear 
definition of ‘the people’ during successive republican eras.14 The socialist/ 
communist system of Nasser had only one sense or definition of ‘the people’, 
members of the Socialist Union.15 Under Sadat’s and Mubarak’s rules, the con-
cept of ‘the people’ was a more imprecise and vague term than that of Nasser’s 
era.16 Instead of setting the concept straight to reflect a democratic form of 
government, these presidents maintained their authority over the judicial 
appointment process. The 2014 Constitution grants the judiciary full inde-
pendence in the appointment process.17 The judiciary is the sole competent 
 authority for judicial appointments. Even though such an act ensures, from the 
judges’ point of view, independence of the appointment process, it still lacks 
any form of checks-and-balances among the judiciary, the executive and the 
legislative authorities. As a result, the definition of ‘the people’, who are the 
purported source of the judge’s legitimacy, remains unclear.
Secondly, the concept of judicial qualification starts once a candidate 
enrolls in law school.18 Any law student is a potential candidate for a judicial 
career. Holding a law degree is the first requirement towards a judicial ca-
reer. A judge in a District Court, is a potential judge for the Court of Appeals, 
and similarly a judge in the Court of Appeals, is a potential candidate for the 
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Supreme Court.19 The judicial appointment process reaches its peak when the 
candidate holds a position in the Supreme Court.20 Judicial qualification cov-
ers three aspects, they are: general judicial requirements, judicial education 
requirements, in addition to judicial training requirements.
There are several general judicial requirements that most jurisdictions 
adopt. One of the most important general requirement is the nationality of the 
judge.21 It is rare to find a foreign judge within any judicial system.22 Other re-
quirements concern the number of years of experience as a lawyer, and wheth-
er he is a law professor, or a prosecutor. Education requirements, however, can 
vary across states, with some leaning towards more than just a law degree.23 
There are only three states that require nothing but a law degree to become 
a judge: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Egypt.24 Many states re-
quire a Master’s degree in law as a prerequisite for judicial appointment.25 The 
third aspect of judicial qualification concerns the training requirement, which 
come in two forms. The first is pre-appointment training, while the second 
concerns continuing education and training.
This article is divided into three main sections. The first is a case study on 
the Egyptian judicial appointment methods. It includes two key aspects that 
are related to judicial qualification requirements, in addition to judicial ap-
pointment powers. This part illustrates the difference between de facto and 
de jure in the judicial appointment system in Egypt. These differences pave 
the road to a deeper understanding of legal and political aspects of discrimi-
nation within the appointment process. The second section discusses the 
contemporary challenges in judicial appointment. The challenges can be 
summarized into: gender inequality, elimination of political minorities, and 
under- privileged citizens. The third and final section proposes a solution for 
the problems identified in this article.
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27 A law degree is required to appoint as a prosecutor, which is the only practical path to 
be appointed as a judge. Refer in that regard to Adel Omar Sherif, ‘Overview of the 
Egyptian Judicial System, and its History’ YearBook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 3 
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28 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 39.
29 Joining the Public Prosecutor Office is usually the first step for judicial appointment. 
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It indicates the general rules of judicial candidates to be: (1) an Egyptian national, (2) 
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foreign comparable degree, (4) does not have criminal or disciplinary records, even if the 
ii Judicial Appointment Rules in Egypt
A Judicial Appointment Qualifications
The required judicial qualifications in Egypt are very few, compared to 
 requirements of Germany, and France.26 The current form of judicial edu-
cation requirements is based on three major aspects: judicial education, 
 Pre-appointment, and Post-appointment judicial training. The first aspect of 
judicial qualification is judicial education. The jal does not require any form 
of training beyond the required law degree.27 Nonetheless, the law grants the 
right to certain categories of lawyers to apply for judicial positions. In theory, 
Article 39 identifies a category of people who claim the right for appointment 
in the judiciary. These aforementioned potential candidates should fulfill one 
of the following conditions, tey have to:
1. have previous work experience as a judge, or worked in a similar position 
according to the law,
2. be a senior public prosecutor,
3. be a public prosecutor with four years of experience,
4. be a junior judge with the State Council, a junior lawyer at the state litiga-
tion authority, or a senior administrative prosecutor,
5. lawyers, who have worked at the Court of Appeals for four years, and have 
a working experience of nine years, and
6. be a law professor, having held this position for at least nine years.28
In practice, however, judicial appointment in Primary Courts is restricted to 
senior public prosecutors, who have reached the age of 30.29 This is a tradition 
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30 Ibid., at art. 49 states “the selection of court judges of first instance of class (B) [is] by way 
of promotion from members of the prosecution on the basis of their seniority, work and 
inspection reports.”
31 Ibid., art. 116.
32 Ibid., art. 9 states that “the Minister of Justice is the competent authority to appoint the 
president of the primary court. Unlike the court of appeals, the appointment is done 
through the seniority principle.”
33 Ahmed El Sayed, ‘Female Judges in Egypt’ YearBook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 135 
(2006–2007): 135–36.
34 They were appointed through an internal call for appointment from the Administrative 
Prosecution Authority ibid., at 136.
35 Ibid at 137.
36 Mohamed Serag, ‘Legal Education in Egypt’ South Texas Law Review 615 (2001–2002): 617.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 The National Center of Judicial Studies Law 347/1981, art. 4.
40 Ibid., at art. 3.
based on Article 49.30 As for the Court of Appeals, the only way to appoint 
judges there is by way of seniority: judges must be at least 43 years of age, and 
have at least 10 years of working experience in Lower Courts.31 Article 9 of the 
jal states that “the MoJ has the right to nominate the Chairperson of the Pri-
mary Courts, with the approval of sjc, for a renewable term of one year.”32 This 
discrepancy between theory and praxis goes back to the authority in charge of 
appointment, which is the Supreme Judicial Council (sjc). In the last 20 years, 
the sjc has never opened its doors to any other category, except on two occa-
sions to appoint female judges.33 There are currently only 68 female judges.34 
The sjc has neither issued a statement prohibiting the appointment of other 
categories, nor opened up applications to these categories.35 As a result, ap-
pointment is naturally restricted to senior public prosecutors.
The second aspect concerns Pre-judicial appointment training. The  National 
Center of Judicial Studies (ncjs) is the body responsible for providing training 
to judges and prosecutors.36 It was established in 1981.37 It is the principal in-
stitute in charge of providing specialized training to judges throughout their 
professional careers.38 It falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, 
which is the competent authority for appointing the Director of the ncjs, 
following the of the sjc.39 The ncjs Director is also the Chairman of the its 
Board. The Board consists of the Director, the Attorney General, four judges, 
and four experts appointed by the Minister of Justice.40
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42 Ibid.
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There is no formal mandate for Pre-appointment training in judicial ap-
pointment.41 Law schools and the judiciary do not recognize judicial intern-
ships.42 In practice, some law firms hire law students, on informal basis, to help 
them acquire legal expertise. Law students are not authorized to formally ap-
pear in courts, even under the supervision of a senior attorney.43
Judicial pre-training for judges differs from that of prosecutors.44 In theory, 
the jal does not explicitly mandate any pre-academic, or professional training 
for judges.45 Nonetheless, the jal implicitly requires these types of training 
by virtue of the appointment of judges, who come from diverse backgrounds. 
The jal provides equal opportunity and ensures diversity by appointing candi-
dates from differnet professional and academic backgrounds. The candidates 
include law professors, administrative prosecutors, public prosecutors, as well 
as lawyers. Whereas in praxis, the Ministry of Justice limits appointments to 
senior public prosecutors only. Limiting the appointment process prompts a 
need for pre-judicial training. Additionally, public prosecution training is lim-
ited to criminal law.46 All prosecutors in Egypt lack the necessary training in 
other legal fields, such as civil law, commercial law, as well as labor law. The 
Ministry of Justice and the sjc necessitate such training for new judges. The 
objective behind this training is to fill the gap between theory and practice. 
The entire pool of candidates is requested to undergo a one-month training 
program during their last summer at the Public Prosecution Office.47
The absence of Pre-appointment training (judicial clerkship) at law schools 
is owed to two reasons. Firstly, law schools neither synchronize clerkship 
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the Middle and North Africa, Equality and Economic Development’ November 2008 
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 accessed 18 May 2017.
49 ‘Higher Education in Egypt’ Egypt Country Profile, 2004, <http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tem-
pus/participating_countries/impact/egypt.pdf> accessed 18 May 2017.
50 Ibid.
51 At the end of the training, there is a final exam that each judge or prosecutor has to pass. 
There are not any failing grade. However, the best three students are awarded a full paid 
trip to attend an international training abroad. This reward increases the competition 
among the participants.
52 Ibid.
53 Judicial Instruction for Prosecutors Manual, art. 795.
opportunities with the Ministry of Justice, nor with private law firms as a 
means of offering technical and professional support to their students. This 
tendency by law firms, while seemingly might appear inexplicable, it may be 
attributed to a tradition of centralized decisions of educational policies in 
Egypt.48 There are two institutions that make the umbrella of the educational 
structure in Egypt. The first is the Ministry of Education, which supervises “all 
post-secondary education, planning, policy formulation, and quality control 
activities.”49 The second instituion is the Supreme Council of Universities, 
which formulates “the overall policy of university education and scientific re-
search in universities, and determines the number of students to be admitted 
to each university, each year.”50 As a general rule, there was no record of either 
of these two bodies coordinating with the Ministry of Justice, or the Supreme 
Judicial Council in an attempt to offer legal education to judges. The Ministry 
of Justice and the sjc only depend on the ncjs to offer legal education, or 
training programs to their members.51
The third aspect is Post-judicial appointment training. The Public Prosecu-
tion Office believes that “the best way to learn how to fight, is to have one.”52 
New prosecutors start their careers without any training. This continues until 
the end of the first two years of their appointment. During these first two years, 
each district attorney aide is assigned to the supervision and guidance of a 
senior public prosecutor.53 The role of the ncjs begins with the end of the first 
two years of appointment. It is then that junior prosecutors undergo a three-
month long training period at the ncjs, for the first time. Senior judges are 
hired to teach junior prosecutors and new judges their new responsibilities. 
Training provides major help in rectifying various common mistakes that were 
committed during the first two years of practical experience. As far as judg-
es are concerned, there is no requirement for formal continuing  education, 
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ing ‘good’ was 4000, of which only 400 were selected to work as aide to district attorney. 
Moreover, the application process for appointments is open at the end of the fourth year 
of law school. This process is limited to graduates of each year; graduates of previous 
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school year only.
57 The advertisement can be found on public newspapers the printed versions.
 except for judges employed by the State Council, who are required to hold two 
legal diplomas in law.54 Other types of training are largely unregulated and 
depend mainly on funding provided by the Ministry of Justice.55
B Judicial Appointment Stages
The judicial Appointment process can be divided into six different stages. The 
first starts with the announcement of an sjc vacancy in the local media, target-
ing fresh law graduates to join the Prosecution Office. As stated earlier, there 
is no form of public call to join the bench. The call is published in two broadly 
circulated national newspapers, as shown in Figure (1). The advertisement 
states the terms and conditions for the application. It specifies when applica-
tion forms will be made available, as well as the deadline for submission. After 
submitting the application, the sjc selects candidates who meet the minimum 
requirement, primarily, a law degree with a general grade of “Good”,56 and sets 
a date for interviews.
The Arab Republic of Egypt 
The Public Prosecution Off ice announces it is 
accepting applications for the vacancy of  
Aide to District Attorney 
Graduating class of 2012 
Overall grade of “Good” 
Applications can be obtained between 
14/12/2013 to 24/12/2013 
The application submission period is from 1/1/2014 to 
24/1/2014 
Candidates must submit all required credentials mentioned 
on the advertisement board in the Court of Cassation. If 
requirements are not met, applications will not be 
accepted. 
Applications submitted either before or after the deadline 
will not be considered  
Figure 1 Advertisement of judicial appointment in public newspapers57
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58 The only legal exception is in the case of appointing assistant public prosecutors. Since 
2006, no one has been appointed directly to be assistant public prosecutor. The sjc never 
discloses the reason why this mode of employment has ceased to be used. This appoint-
ment process is based on The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 116. It states “no one 
can be appointed in the position of assistant public prosecutor, except the aide of district 
attorney, unless the candidate passes a comprehensive exam.”
59 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 38 states “candidates should have no criminal 
records, and has a good reputation.”
60 Ibid., “be of good standing and reputation” is a vague term that there is not much about it. 
It is left as it is to open the door to the illuminate any candidate for such reason.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
The second stage is the exam, or the sjc interview stage. In theory, the jal 
does not specify any entry test condition.58 In praxis, however, the sjc  
schedules interviews for all applicants in order to asses their legal prowess. 
Candidates are asked three criminal law questions, one of which should be 
addressed correctly. At the conclusion of the interview period, results are not 
divulged by the sjc to candidates. Candidates are then only informed in the 
event of a positive feedback, and in the case they got accepted as district attor-
ney aides. This takes a duration of 12–24, starting with the date of the interview. 
Names of successful candidates are then sent by the sjc, to the Ministry of 
Justice to commence the third stage.
The third stage starts with the receipt of the names of potential candidates 
by the Ministry of Justice. During this stage, the Ministry of Justice runs all 
necessary security and background checks on candidates. It cooperates then 
with the Ministry of the Interior in obtaining criminal and political record 
clearances, which make up the fourth stage. The jal does not clearly indicate 
the nature of crimes that potentially stand in the way of a candidate’s appoint-
ment. Candidates should have no criminal, disciplinary, or rehabilitating re-
cords.59 it is mandatory that they are of ‘good’ standing and reputation.60 The 
connotation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reputation is left to be determined by the sjc 
and the security agencies.61
If the candidate’s record is cleared, the application goes through a second 
round of background checks, which involves the candidate’s family’s criminal 
record. In theory, the background check is limited to that of the candidate. 
However, in practice, the sjc, and the Ministry of Justice extend their security 
check to include the candidate’s extended family’s backgrounds, the fourth 
degree of kinship (second cousins and their spouses).62 In their application, 
candidates are asked to fill out a family-tree form. This form includes names, 
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63 Appendix 3 of the Public Prosecution Office appointment application contains charts of 
the application family members. Each candidate has to fill this appendix at the best of his 
knowledge. It is also important to know that such appendix also exists in the police and 
army academies. So, they can make sure that no police or army officer would have any 
political affiliation.
64 Ibid.
65 Atef Farouk, ‘Exclusion of the Muslim brotherhood from the public prosecution appoint-
ment’ Vetogate, July 27, 2013, <http://www.vetogate.com/447110> accessed 18 May 2017.
66 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 73.
67 This information is required in the application for the aide to the district attorney. The ap-
plication asks much information about candidate and his family’s history. It also requires 
any stating any travel or relation with international organization, see in that regard the 
general terms in Maysar Yassin, al-watan tanshor shorowt al-taqadam lewazefat ma’awn 
al-nayabah, Waten Newpaper, November 21, 2014 <http://www.elwatannews.com/news/
details/602292> accessed 18 May 2017.
addresses, and employment standing of family members. the background 
check includes parents, grandparents, siblings, uncles, and cousins, as well 
as their spouses.63 Both the candidates and their fathers are furthermore re-
quired to submit fingerprinting record to verify data submitted on their crimi-
nal background. In the event that a crime has been committed by a member 
of the candidate’s family, this is enough reason for the elimination of the the 
candidate from the pool of appointees.64
The fourth stage gives the National Security Agency (nsa) the authority to 
examine the candidates’, and their families’, political affiliation as well. The sjc 
and the Ministry of Justice practice a zero-tolerance policy regarding politi-
cal connections, specifically in regards to that with Islamists, liberal parties, or 
similar groups.65 In theory, there is no direct legal foundation for such extensive 
security checks of the candidates by the nsa. However, it has been argued that 
Article 73 that stipulates the prohibition of political participation of both judg-
es and courts, also applies to potential candidates of the judiciary. Article 73 of 
the jal clearly forbids participation, in any form, in political activity: “courts 
are banned from expressing any political view, and judges are prohibited from 
engaging in any political action. This could mean suspension of election to 
the General Assembly, regional bodies, political organizations, unless after the 
person in question submits his/her resignation.”66 In practice, the Ministry of 
Justice is the only competent authority for coordinating between the sjc and 
the nsa. This step is not publicized by the sjc to the candidates. However, in 
reality, if a candidate chooses to challenge the requirement of a security check 
of his/her relatives, he is instantly eliminated from the list of candidates.67 
 Automatic exclusion is immediately applied without any justification.
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68 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 118.
69 Tarek Hafez, ‘Wokala al-nayabah aljodod yodown al-kashf al-tabi we-yanhown ijrahat 
t’ynahom’ Masress, July 13, 2014, <http://www.masress.com/elfagr/1641454> accessed 18 
May 2017.
70 The president can refuse to appoint certain candidate, but cannot propose to add a new 
name. However, there is not any evidence that the president refused or proposed certain 
names. The presidential decree is a procedural issue.
71 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 44.
72 Ibid.
73 The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 71.
74 Ibid., art. 44.
75 sjc takes a major role in the appointment of new prosecutors because 2014 Constitu-
tion considers Public Prosecution Office as an integral part of the judiciary. The 2014 
The fifth stage is a mandatory medical examination involving blood and 
urine sampling, the aim of which is to ensure that potential candidates are free 
of alcohol and substanse dependency. In theory, this test is neither obligatory, 
nor enforced by the jal.68 Again, in reality, the sjc and the Ministry of Justice 
enforce and mandate such tests for each candidate. Even though the law does 
not stipulate such a requirement, candidates cannot go against the norm, and 
challenge this requirement takeoff taking the test. Each year, candidates who 
fail the medical test are excluded from the list of candidates.69 This medical 
test is for first-time appointees only; which means that when prosecutors are 
promoted to judges, there is no such requirement again. The same applies if a 
junior judge is promoted to work at the Court of Appeals, the Court of Cassa-
tion or the Supreme Constitutional Court.
In stage six, a presidential appointment ruling is dispensed for the appoint-
ment of new candidates.70 The President is given complete and ultimate au-
thority by the jal to issue the decree of appointment of judges and aides to 
public prosecutors.71 The names of the accepted candidates are published in 
“two widely distributed newspapers.”72 After which point, candidates take the 
long-awaited-for judicial oath before the Minister of Justice. The oath reads: “I 
swear by the almighty God to judge among people with justice and respect to 
the laws.” The same oath will again be sworn when a senior prosecutor is pro-
moted to become judge. The oath is generally required in the life of the judge 
on three occasions only: when a judge is appointed as an attorney general, as 
president of the Court of Cassation, and as a judge at the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court.73 In all of these cases, the judge takes the oath before the Presi-
dent of the Republic.74
When prosecutors are promoted to judges at the age of 30, there is no pre-
requisite of passing the previously described five steps, at this stage of their 
careers, judges will only take the final requisite.75 Again, the sjc forwards 
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2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33308518> accessed 18 May 2017.
81 Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na’b al-Am, Albawaba News, 11 September 
2015, <http://www.albawabhnews.com/1493128> accessed 18 May 2017.
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the names of the successful senior public prosecutors to the President of the 
Republic to issue the presidential appointment decree. New judges are then 
sworn in before the sjc.76 The Court of Cassation is the supreme court for the 
ordinary judiciary. As for the scc, the appointment procedure goes through an 
internal call for applications. The announcement is sent (by the scc) to the or-
dinary judiciary, and the state council. The announcement is thus distributed 
internally among judges for those who wish to apply for a position at the scc.77 
the process for the appointment with the State Council, is similar to that of the 
ordinary judiciary.
As far as the appointment of the attorney general is concerned, the sjc is 
the competent authority to handle the appointment process. Prior to 2014, the 
President of the Republic was the only authority who had complete control 
over appointing the attorney general.78 However, this has changed with the 
formulation of the 2014 Constitution. The Constitution has transferred this au-
thority over to the sjc.79 After the assassination of the Attorney General Hes-
ham Barakat in 2015,80 the appointment process of appointing a new attorney 
general was deferred for over six months.81 The reason for the delay was that 
the President had wanted to appoint the new attorney general himself. This 
has created tension, since the sjc upheld its constitutional position, and sole 
right to perform the appointment process.82 Eventually, the sjc has won the 
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battle, and appointed the new attorney general Nabil Sadek. The judicial oath, 
however, had to be taken before the President of the Republic.83
iii Contemporary Challenges in the Judicial Appointment Process
A Class Segregation
The first category of candidates that was eliminated from the appointment 
process is that of candidates who hail from humble economic and financial 
backgrounds. The history of this exclusion dates a long way back, before the 
start of the Republic era even. When Egypt was still a Monarchy, the King had 
ultimate and sole authority to appoint judges. Article 7 of the 1947 Judicial In-
dependence Law states,“the appointment of judges is carried out through a 
monarchical decree.”84 The 1952 coup d’état overthrew the monarchy.85 It prop-
agated against the domination of the upper class in the Egyptian society. One 
of the most prominent potentials of the Revolution, was to increase visibil-
ity and participation of candidates who come from under-priviliged financial 
and economic classes. These candidates were promised appointment in the 
army, the police, and the judiciary, that was a promise that still remains to be 
fulfilled.86
The lower classes have battled for ages, and have met with innumerable ob-
stacles to take their faire share of these jobs. Successive regimes have covertly 
suppressed that wish of the underprivileged, from obtaining equal right access 
to public jobs, especially that of judicial appointments. Being high achieving 
and intelligent students of law did not intercede for their inclusion into public 
office. Inconveniences to join the judiciary continued.87 In 2011, 138 candidates 
claimed that they were rejected from the appointment process because their 
parents did not hold a university degree.88 Exclusion of the  underprivileged 
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has been brought to the attention of the sjc several times. The issue, how-
ever, has neither been overtly acknowledged, nor justified in any official 
announcement.
Even though the sjc has never divulged its reason for this type of elimina-
tion, the Minister of Justice recently declared his position. In May 2015, the 
Minister of Justice, Judge Mahfouz Saber, was asked during a television in-
terview whether “the son of a garbage collector stood any chance of appoint-
ment as a public prosecutor.”89 To this question, Judge Saber replied “the judge 
should be from a proper social class … with all due respect to garbage collec-
tors, and to those below, or above him … a proper environment, and a good 
social class are necessary … I am not saying he should be an aristocrat … I am 
saying the class should not be very low.”90 As a result, of this statement, Saber 
resigned from office a week later.
The sjc netiehr denied, nor supported his statement.91 It is common knowl-
edge that underprivileged citizens do not stand an equal chance in the appoint-
ment process, or secure judicial or prosecution jobs. The Minister’s resignation 
was not the result of an untruthful, ; rather it was for expressing in public, a 
truth that has for decades remained unspoken. Such inequality favors judges’ 
sons, and their relatives, who make up an undeclared quota.92 President of the 
Judges’ Club, Judge Al-Zend asserts that “appointing the offspring ofjudges is a 
practice that will never cease will continue … there is no single force in Egypt 
that can stop such a tradition.”93 The Judges’ Club is the only democratic or-
ganization within the Egyptian judiciary.94 His statement was considered the 
first official statement from a high-ranking member in the judiciary to publicly 
speak of the this hidden quota. Prior to Al-Zend’s statement, there was a covert 
consensus of such a practice, of giving preference to children and relatives of 
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members of the judiciary. It was not until later that the press tracked down the 
appointees and their relatives. Successive reports were published in the local 
newspaper Al Shorouk. The first report came out in 2013,95 and revealed that 
more than 114 out of 475 appointees (24%) in the Public Prosecution Office 
were relatives of members of the judiciary.96 In 2014, this percentage increased 
from 25% to 35%. 168 out of 485 district attorney aide appointees were rela-
tives of judges.97 The report showed parents of 87 candidates worked in the 
Court of Appeal, parents of 11 candidates worked in the Court of Cassation, and 
parents of 55 candidates were judges and prosecutors.98 Both reports revealed 
the names of the candidates, and their kinship to members of the judiciary.99
B Gender-based Segregation
In theory, there is no legal hinderance to the appointment of women as judg-
es or prosecutors. Furthermore, successive judicial laws have not prohibited 
women from joining the bench. The language of the jal is very clear in refer-
ring to candidates in a gender-neutral tone. Moreover, advertisements for judi-
cial vacancies never state that positions are restricted to male candidates.100 In 
reality, however, women stand a meager chance of joining the bench as judges, 
or criminal prosecutors. Raising the issue of women appointment in the judi-
ciary was brought up for the first time in 1951. Professor Aisha Rateb, who was 
Egypt’s first female ambassador, was the first woman to apply for the position 
of judge in State Council.101 Not surprisingly, her request was denied. She then 
sued the State Council’s administration for denying her request. She fought 
her case all the way to the Supreme Administrative Court.102 Professor Abdel 
Razzak Al-Sanhuri, the founder of modern administrative and civil laws, also 
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denied her appeal as President of the Supreme Administrative Court.103 He 
stated that there were no barriers against the appointment of women, except 
on administrative grounds.104 Hence, the decision to exclude the applicant 
was sustained as long as there was no evidence of misuse of power against the 
claimant, Al-Sanhuri stated:
Limiting some jobs – in the ordinary judiciary, and state council – to 
men, and excluding women, is based on the administration’s discretion. 
The administration enjoys full authority and vision that enables it to de-
termine the suitability of any candidate, and according to the nature of 
certain appointments. The administration can also base its decision on 
long-standing customs and surrounding environment. This shall not be 
interpreted as underestimating the value of women, or their dignity. It 
shall furthermore neither underestimate their intellectual, cultural, and 
educational levels, nor shall infringe their rights. However, it is left to the 
discretion of the administration to determine the suitability of certain 
jobs, for certain categories. The administration shall by no means jeopar-
dize the principle of legal equality.105
The ban on women to join the bench continued all the way until 2007, 
with the exception of two cases.106 Firstly, women were allowed to join the 
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112 The 2014 Constitution, art. 11 states “the state commits to taking the necessary measures to 
ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner 
administrative prosecution Office, only to fill a quota of 25% of the work-
force.107 Secondly, Justice Tahani Al-Gebali was the first and the last justice to 
join the Supreme Constitutional Court.108 In 2007, the exception extended to 
a new initiative to open the doors for women to join the bench.109 This initia-
tive was limited to female administrative prosecutors, who wished to join the 
ordinary judiciary. As a result, 31 female administrative prosecutors were able 
to join the ordinary judiciary as judges.110
One of the major drawbacks affecting the progress of women’s appointment 
in the judiciary, was the failure of the State Council to recognize their right to 
be appointed initially. In 2010, the State Council announced welcoming nomi-
nations of female applicants to join the bench. Sadly, this decision triggered 
major opposition from the General Assembly. The General Assembly called for 
an urgent meeting to challenge the decision of the Board. In the meantime, 24 
female candidates filled out their applications. Before the closing date and dur-
ing the submission period, the State Council’s General Assembly (the whole 
judges working at the State Council) held an urgent session to nullify the deci-
sion of the State Council board to appoint women. This was the manifestation 
of a real blow to equity and inclusion. This decision led to massive speculation, 
and innumerable debates surrounding the reasons and motives behind such a 
step.111 It has instigated many protests from feminist movements, and women’s 
rights groups in Egypt, many of which have expressed their concern about the 
future of equality in the country. The movement has thus far succeeded in im-
posing a constitutional right that is not yet in force.112
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Justice Adel Farghaly, a member of the General Assembly of the State Coun-
cil, further made an argument against the inclusion of women in judicial ap-
pointment. In so doing, he firstly distinguished between rights and obligations. 
He regarded joining of the judiciary as an obligation, rather than a right.113 He 
maintained that Egyptian men endure more obligations than women. He gave 
an example of mandatory military service, which he said is a prerequisite that 
women are exempt from.114 He stated that the “refusal to appoint women to 
senior judicial positions has always been based on the fact that Egyptian wom-
en are not asked to perform military service and ‘offer sacrifice’ like men.” He 
further stipulated that women occupy judicial functions in western countries 
because women there equally perform military service, along with various jobs 
equal to those of men, including jobs of physical labor.115 Secondly, judges and 
prosecutors are required to relocate to different districts every three to five 
years. This continuous relocation process would not suit the nature of women, 
as care givers. He stated that “judicial work in Egypt is not suitable for women, 
as they cannot balance their work with personal life duties. They have always 
been the major care providers for their families, unlike men.”116
Currently, there is a constitutional dictate for judicial appointment of wom-
en, opening doors for women to join the bench.117 Nonetheless, until mid 2017, 
the sjc had just initiated one special appointment call that is limited for new 
female candidates to join the bench.118 As for the Public Prosecution Office it is 
still limited to male candidates only.119 The 2014 Constitution leaves the debate 
open to the discretion of the administration to appoint women filling judi-
cial vacancies. Firstly, Article 9 eliminates any form of discrimination against 
women. It states “the state ensures equal opportunity for all citizens without 
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discrimination.”120 Secondly, Article 11 mandates that the administration ap-
points women in the judiciary. The article explicitly states the right of women 
to secure official judiciary posts. This article withholds any argument by the 
administration that inhibits the appointment of women in certain posts.121
C Political Affiliation Segregation
The jal bans both courts and judges from either declaring their political opin-
ion, or participating in any political forum.122 This ban is restricted to judges 
and courts. Moreover, the sjc and the Ministry of Justice have extended the 
ban to include judicial candidates. Their practice encourages the exclusion of 
candidates with a political affiliation. Even though political orientation is not 
a crime, there is a tradition of excluding candidates for their, or their families’ 
engagement in politics. This unwritten tradition allows the nsa to interfere in 
the appointment process, as it can exclude any candidate for these reasons.
The nsa, which carries out the security check on candidates, is notorious 
for its ambiguity, and lack of transparency in conducting background checks 
for new candidates. It is widely known that the majority of the police force is 
corrupt, and lacks transparency.123 Candidates are not allowed access to their 
security files that contain background checks. This means that in the case of 
exclusion, they are unable to contest or appeal their security status.124 The 
nsa does not reveal the content of their files, and treats them with a great 
deal of confidentiality, and lacking transparency.125 There has never been a 
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comprehensible reason why these reports are handled in such a manner, with 
regard to both general and national security checks.
Having family ndp affiliation does not stop candidates from joining the 
bench, while any affiliation to Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood 
(mb), is considered political affiliation, resulting in instant elimination from 
candidacy. Currently, the ban on political participation is restricted to Islamist 
political  affliction.126 The absence of real political parties in Egypt before the 
2011 Revolution, has resulted in the mb being the only serious political com-
petitor of the National Democratic Party (ndp).127 ndp-affiliated officials 
banned the mb both before January 2011, and after July 2013.128 The leading 
political parties in the country were predominantly the ndp, and the mb.129
iv Proposed Reform of the Egyptian Judiciary
This article, based on the previous presentation of judicial appointment in 
Egypt, recommends the following three major venues of reform of the ap-
pointment system. Firstly, the sjc must undergo complete makeover. The 
need for reform of the sjc is primarily due to the lack of checks and balances. 
Historically, the Egyptian judiciary has never accepted the interference of 
the  President of the Republic in the selection of its members, as illustrated 
in the above mentioned dispute that arose between the sjc, and the President 
on the  appointment of the attorney general in 2015.
Moreover, the new sjc shall not include any members of the legislative au-
thority, until the idea of public involvement is widely accepted among judges. 
Egypt does not have independent house of representatives. In the 2015 parlia-
mentary elections, allegations emerged that the Egyptian General Intelligence 
Directorate (gid), had interfered. Mr. Hazem Abdel Azim, the former-member 
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of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s presidential campaign, stated that “For the 
love of Egypt’ a political association, which won all 120 closed-list seats, was 
founded under the supervision of the gid, and that meetings surrounding its 
establishment were held at gid headquarters.”130 As a result, any reform based 
on the participation of both executive or legislative authorities would face ma-
jor resistance from the judicial community.
Secondly, the sjc is the competent authority for appointing judges and 
prosecutors.131 As indicated earlier, it is not founded on principles of democ-
racy. The appointment authority should be separated from the sjc. Also, the 
judicial appointment process should be assigned to an independent body that 
includes judges, lawyers, law professors, and representatives from the public. 
The role of this body would be to separate between the authority of impeach-
ment, from that of appointment. The appointment authority will work to en-
sure equal treatment among a pool of diverse candidates, and work against 
discrimination.132 As shown previously, there is a long history of discrimina-
tion against women, and more particularly the underprivileged, despite the 
fact that discrimination is illegal and prohibited.133 Potentially, this reform will 
impact and promote the inclusion of women, the underprivileged, as well as 
political minorities.
As far as gender equality is concerned, the 2014 Constitution mandates the 
appointment of women in the judiciary.134 However, in the past two years, 
women have not had an equal share of appointment in both the ordinary and 
the administrative judiciary.135 The sjc continues to ban women from being 
part of the judiciary, as it has done previously with the lawyers’ quota in ap-
pointments.136 The jal stipulates two quotas for lawyers to be appointed as 
judges and prosecutors. Article 47 states that the yearly quota should not be 
less than 25% for the appointment of judges in primary courts, and 10% for 
appointments in the Court of Appeals.137 Article 118 states that the quota of 
 23judicial appointment (reform)
middle east law and governance 10 (2017) 1-24
<UN>
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
138 Ibid., art. 118.
139 Nadler (n 2) at 123.
140 Ibid., at 124.
141 Ibid.
142 Mayoral (n 18) at 1130.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Serage (n 37) at 617.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Tosun and Yilmaz (n 49).
lawyers shall be no less than 25% of the total appointees each year for the 
Prosecution Office.138
The underprivileged and political minorities, who meet the appointment 
requirements, would obtain support from non-judge members of the sjc, 
while judges would be more objective in their rejection of underprivileged 
candidates. Both professors and lawyers would represent the essence and core 
of the legal profession. Even though disagreements exist between them and 
judges, there is still a great deal of mutual respect among members of the legal 
community in Egypt. The underprivileged and political minorities, as well as 
other members of the sjc, would benefit from increased diversity in the sjc.
Thirdly, there are three new judicial requirements that should be added to 
the current appointment requirements, namely improving education stan-
dards,139 introducing judicial internship programs for law graduates,140 in 
addition to banning any political reports from appointment requirements.141 
Education standards need to be improved.142 Allowing minimum education 
requirements leaves the doors for mediocre candidates, especially with the in-
creasing number of law graduates in Egypt.143 Improving higher educational 
standards can improve the appointment requirements, such as legal diplomas, 
or llm.144 This will not result in an added financial burden for candidates, as 
the cost of one diploma at Cairo University costs less than $100.145
Training, prior to appointment, must be a prerequisite to the Egyptian le-
gal system. The implementation of this system would achieve four purposes. 
Firstly, it will provide law students with a deeper perspective on the intricacies 
of the court system.146 Secondly, law interns would contribute to judges’ efforts 
in research, data collection, editing, and writing. Thirdly, interns would come 
at no additional cost to the judiciary, since they gain knowledge in exchange 
for their services.147 And finally, at the end of their internships, interns would 
be handed assessment reports that could later be used as additional references 
during the appointment process.148 As for the political reports requirement, 
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banning such reports would end the executive authority’s influence on the 
nomination process. Active political affiliation of judicial members can be le-
gally handled through an impeachment process,149 while executive interven-
tion cannot be rectified later.150
v Conclusion
To sum up the main goals of this research, they can be summarized in the fol-
lowing points: Firstly, a new construction of the sjc must be introduced to 
reflect democratic and accountable judiciary system to the public, which is the 
source of judicial authority. The judiciary has to adopt transparency, a painful 
exercise as it may sound. Failing to abide by the new construction will surely 
result in the continuation of a tendentious, and sectarian system. This will con-
tinue to raise the question that lurks in the minds of the people, “when will 
the judiciary rid itself of corrupt and prejudiced practices, both internally and 
externally?”
The sjc must attract new members in the appointment committee. Benefits 
will be immesurable, this will reflect a democratic and transparent appoint-
ment process. Additionally, it will showcase the legitimacy of the committee’s 
members. New members can be senior professional, who enjoy respect and 
credibility within the judicial community. Secondly, now is the time for the 
elimination of all discriminatory practices against candidates of lower classes, 
political affiliation, and women, among others. It is no longer acceptable that 
while the law does not recognize any form of discrimination among individu-
als, the judiciary still continues to exercise such discrimination. Finally, there 
is a need to choose only those who worked for and attained the highest educa-
tional and professional standards. Those who have gone through extra educa-
tion, as well post-appointment training programs (internships). These, along 
with post graduate degrees, should be the only criteria required for judicial 
appointment.
